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The Missouri Federal District Court identified several
factors in analyzing whether the contracts in question were
futures contracts, subject to the Commodity Exchange
Act, or were cash forward contracts not subject to CEA.
The factors included— (1) whether the contracts had
“inherent value,” (2) market characteristics; (3) whether
delivery is contemplated; (4) the underlying purpose of the
contracts; (5) whether standardized form contracts were
used; and (6) the nature of the parties to the transactions
involved in the dispute.
The court sided with the elevator and held that the
contracts were within the cash forward contract exception.
Accordingly, the federal court dismissed the action.  The
case now goes back to state court.
*  *  *  *  *
The two cases, in Minnesota and Missouri, both found
the contracts in question to be cash forward contracts.  The
Missouri case, however, did not involve a focus on sales
of crops beyond what was in storage or could be produced
in the current production cycle.  More court decisions are
expected—and these two may be appealed.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 10 Harl, Agricultural Law § 74.04
(1997).
2 See Harl, “Hazards of Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts,” 7
Agric. L. Dig. 77 (1997).
3 7 U.S.C. § 6(a).  See In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 312
(9th Cir. 1991).
4 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(11).
5 In re Grain Land Coop Case, Civ. No. 3-96-1209 (D.
Minn. 1997).
6 See n. 4 supra.
7 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(11).
8 H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 129-130
(1974); See CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680
F.2d 573, 579 (9th Cir. 1982).  See also
“Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward
Contracts and ‘Trade’ Options,” 50 Fed. Reg. 39656,
Sept. 30, 1985.
9 Bunker v. Farmers Elevator Co. of Hopkins, Civ. No.
97-0137-CV-W-SCW (W.D. Mo. 1997).
10 See n. 2 supra.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIMS. Two banks had obtained judgments against
the debtor on loans made to the debtor for agricultural
operations. The debtor then filed for Chapter 12. Because
the value of the collateral securing the loans was much
less than the judgments, the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
classified the judgments as partially unsecured. The banks
and the debtor negotiated the value of the collateral
securing the claims and the plan included the agreed-to
value which was higher than the value originally attributed
to the property. The court found that the value agreed to
was a negotiated value and not a value determined by
appraisal. The negotiated value was incorporated into the
Chapter 12 plan. The plan did not mention the unsecured
portion of the banks’ claims but did list other unsecured
claims. Under the plan, the unsecured claims would not
receive any payments. The plan was confirmed. During
the plan period, the debtor received an inheritance which
was eventually included in the debtor’s disposable income
available for payment of unsecured claims. The banks
sought a modification of the plan to include their
unsecured claims. The debtor argued that the banks had
waived the unsecured claims. The court agreed, holding
that, because the banks had negotiated a higher value of
the collateral under the original plan in exchange for the
release of their unsecured claims, the banks had waived
those unsecured claims. First Nat’l Bank v. Allen, 118
F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 1997).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. The debtor had
purchased a farm from a bank for $40,000 in cash and a
contract to pay the remainder in installments. The contract
provided that the bank remained the title holder until the
final installment was paid. At that time, the bank was to
provide a warranty deed to the property. Title insurance
was purchased for the debtor and the contract was
recorded. The bank claimed that the contract was
executory, requiring the debtor to  affirm or reject the
contract. The debtor argued that the contract was a secured
financing device, allowing the debtor to modify the terms
of the contract under the Chapter 11 plan. Although the
court noted that several other courts have held that all land
sale installment contracts were or were not executory, the
court followed In re Robert L. Helms Contr. & Dev. Co.,
110 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1997) in examining all the
circumstances to determine the nature of the contract. The
court examined Idaho law to determine the nature of the
contract rights and obligations. Under Idaho law, when the
debtor’s equity exceeded the seller’s damages from a
breach of the contract, the contract must be foreclosed in
the same manner as a mortgage. The court found that,
under the contract, the bank’s only remaining obligation
under the contract was to supply title to the property and
the debtor’s only obligation was to pay the remaining
obligation. The bank argued that it also had the obligation
to provide marketable title. The court found no basis for
this distinction, noting that the bank would have no
motivation for clouding the title. The court also ignored
the characterization in the contract that the contract was
executory, holding that the true nature of the contract was
to operate as security for the debtor’s obligation to make
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the installment payments. In re Heward Bros., 210 B.R.
475 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997).
SETOFF. The debtor had obtained a loan from the
FmHA on which the debtor had defaulted pre-petition.
The debtor had also enrolled farm land in the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The FmHA (now
FSA) notified the debtor of its application to the ASCS
(now also FSA) to offset the debtor’s CRP payments
against the default on the debtor’s FmHA loan. The offset
was allowed, the debtor filed for Chapter 13 and the
debtor assumed the CRP contract. The debtor argued that
the FmHA was not entitled to offset the CRP payments in
the bankruptcy case because the CRP contract was
executory and contingent upon the debtor’s performance.
In addition, the assumption of the contract post-petition
destroyed the mutuality between the pre- and post-petition
CRP contracts. The court held that the filing of the
bankruptcy case and assumption of the CRP contract did
not change the basic rights and obligations of the parties
and that the CRP payments could be offset against the
debtor’s debt to the FmHA. The District Court remanded
the case but remand was delayed for rulings at the circuit
court level. In spite of circuit court rulings that the CCC
was a separate governmental agency, allowing setoff, the
Bankruptcy Court held that setoff was not allowed in this
case because post-petition CRP payments were too
contingent upon funding from Congress and the debtor’s
compliance with the CRP contract. In re Buckner, 211
B.R. 46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1997), on rem. from, 165 B.R.
942 (D. Kan. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. After the debtor filed for
Chapter 7, the IRS sent the debtor a Notice of Proposed
Assessment of an I.R.C. § 6672 penalty as a responsible
person in a corporation which failed to pay employee
taxes. The IRS argued that the Notice did not amount to an
assessment or attempt to collect the penalty. The court
noted, however, that the Notice threatened collection if the
debtor did not pay the penalty or file a protest within 30
days, and the court held that the Notice was an assessment
of a penalty in violation of the automatic stay. The court
also held that actions which violated the automatic stay
were void ab initio; therefore, the IRS penalty assessment
was void. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
violation of the automatic stay did not cause the
assessment to be void. Riley v. United States, 118 F.3d
1220 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’g, 192 B.R. 727 (E.D. Mo.
1995).
The IRS began collection efforts against the debtor by
seizing the debtor’s inventory of automobiles. During the
seizure process, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 and
informed the IRS agents that further seizure of the
automobiles would be a violation of the automatic stay.
The agents contacted their superior who authorized the
continued seizure. The autos were removed and placed in
a secured lot until their return was ordered by the court.
The debtor sought damages for violation of the automatic
stay. The court held that the IRS agents acted in a good
faith belief that the post-petition seizure was allowed
because the levy was served on the debtor pre-petition. In
addition, the court held that the debtor was not entitled to
any damage award because the debtor failed to prove any
actual damages from the post-petition removal of the
autos. The court further held that the IRS was not entitled
to any recovery for its expenses in executing the levy. In
re A & J Auto Sales, Inc., 210 B.R. 667 (Bankr. D. N.H.
1997). See also In re A&J Auto Sales, Inc., 205 B.R. 676
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1996) p. 75 supra.
The debtors filed for bankruptcy and before the IRS
was served with notice of the filing, the IRS filed a levy
with the debtors’ bank against the debtors’ bank account.
The debtors’ attorney informed the IRS about the
bankruptcy filing but the IRS refused to return the levied
funds. The debtors claimed that the loss of the use of the
funds resulted in a default on their mortgage payment and
incurring of legal fees from the default, legal fees from
bringing the current action and bank fees to process the
levy. The court held that, although the initial levy was a
good faith levy, the retention of the funds was an
intentional violation of the automatic stay; therefore, the
debtors were entitled to recover their actual, consequential
damages from the violation. In re Milto, 210 B.R. 687
(Bankr. D. Md. 1997).
DISCHARGE. The debtors filed their 1990 tax return
in October 1992. The debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition in
September 1994 which was dismissed in November 1994.
The debtors filed the current Chapter 7 case in January
1995. The debtors sought discharge of their 1990 taxes as
filed more than three years before the petition. The court
held that the first Chapter 7 filing tolled the three year
period limitation of Section 523. In re Brent, 97-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,699 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
POST-PETITION PENALTIES AND INTEREST.
The IRS had filed undisputed pre-petition priority tax
claims in the debtors’ Chapter 12 case. Payment of the
taxes was provided in the plan and a discharge was
granted after all plan payments were made. The IRS then
sought payment of interest and penalties which accrued
post-petition on the priority tax claims.  The court held
that, as in Chapter 13 cases, post-petition interest on tax
claims in Chapter 12 cases is discharged upon payment of
the underlying tax claim.  The court also held that I.R.C. §
6658(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes imposition of tax penalties on
tax claims during the pendency of a bankruptcy case. In re
Mitchell, 210 B.R. 978 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
POST-PETITION TAXES. In December 1993, the
debtor filed for Chapter 11 and did not make the election
to end the debtor’s tax year upon the filing of the petition.
In February 1994, the debtor, as debtor-in-possession, paid
the debtor’s individual 1993 taxes from estate property.
The court ordered the debtor to return the funds to the
bankruptcy estate as an unauthorized post-petition
payment. In re Smith, 210 B.R. 689 (Bankr. D. Md.
1997).
REFUND. The debtor filed for Chapter 13 in May
1996. The debtor filed the tax returns for 1991 through
1995 in June 1996, claiming a refund for 1991 through
1994 tax years. The debtor paid the taxes for 1991 and
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1992 through taxes withheld from wages by the debtor’s
employer. The court held that 1991 taxes were considered
paid on April 15, 1992, and the 1992 taxes were
considered paid on April 15, 1993, both more than three
years before the debtor filed the refund claim for 1991 and
1992. The court held that I.R.C. § 6511 barred the refund
claims because they were filed more than three years after
the taxes were paid for the years for which the refund
claims were filed. In re Farrell, 211 B.R. 79 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1997).
TAX LIEN. In February 1994, the IRS filed and
perfected a tax lien against the debtor’s property for
payment of taxes for 1988, 1990 and 1991. The debtor
then filed for Chapter 7 and the taxes for those years were
held to be dischargeable. The debtor sought to avoid the
tax lien under Section 545(2) and I.R.C. § 6323(b) or to
reduce the lien to the value of the property owned by the
debtor on the date of the lien filing. The court held that the
lien was neither avoidable nor reducible. In re Cleary,
210 B.R. 741 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiff
was a farmer who entered into cash forward contracts with
the defendant elevator for the sale of corn and soybeans.
The plaintiff filed a suit in federal district court involving
the contracts and the defendant sought removal of the case
to state court. The issue was whether the contracts were
governed by the Commodity Exchange Act, giving the
federal court jurisdiction over the suit. The court examined
several factors in holding that the contracts were not
commodity futures contracts governed by the CEA. The
court found that the contracts had marketing
characteristics of cash forward contracts in that the terms
changed over time. The court also found that the contracts
involved products with inherent value and that the subject,
grain, of the contracts had inherent value and was not
speculative. The court also found that the parties to the
contracts actually intended delivery to take place;
therefore, the likelihood of delivery was greater than for
speculative contracts. The opinion does not discuss
whether the contracts had rollover provisions. The court
also found that the parties involved were not speculators
and investors. Therefore, the court held that the contracts
were not commodity futures contracts not governed by the
CEA.  Bunker v. Farmers Elevator Co., Civ. No. 97-
0137-CV-W-SCW (W.D. Mo. Sept. 18, 1997). See also
the lead article in this issue.
This case involved an agricultural cooperative which
bought and sold grain as part of its grain elevator and
agricultural services business. The grain was produced by
members and sold to the cooperative through hedge-to-
arrive (HTA) contracts. The other parties were the
producer/members. The parties had executed several
thousand HTA contracts over the years with no problems
until the price of grain began a steady increase over two
years. In order to stem its losses from the contracts, the
cooperative sought to terminate the HTA contracts in
favor of regular sales contracts. The producers sought to
enforce the contracts as written. The cooperative argued
that the contracts were unenforceable commodity futures
contracts which did not comply with the Commodity
Exchange Act. The cooperative pointed to the rollover
provisions which made the contracts indefinite as to
delivery and to the pricing terms which allowed future
price changes. The court held that the contracts were cash
forward contracts because the parties were both in the
grain business, intended delivery and had established a
pricing mechanism under the contracts. The court noted
that, although the contracts had rollover provisions which
could continue indefinitely, the parties had used the
contracts for actual delivery over the years without
problems. In re Grain Land Coop. Cases, Civ. No. 3-96-
1209 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 1997).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COMMUNITY LOANS. The FSA has issued
proposed regulations governing the Community Programs
Guaranteed Loan Program. The proposed regulations
move the regulations to a new subpart, shift loan
documentation and analysis responsibility to lenders, and
generally streamline the regulations governing the
program. 62 Fed. Reg. 52277 (Oct. 7, 1997), adding 7
C.F.R. § 1980.801 et seq.
DISASTER ASSISTANCE. The FSA has issued
interim regulations implementing the 1997 tree assistance
program. The program is limited to losses from natural
disasters occurring from October 1, 1996 through
September 30, 1997. Cost-share assistance may not exceed
100 percent of the eligible replacement or rehabilitation
costs and may be based on average costs or the actual
costs for the replanting practices, as determined by the
Deputy Administrator for Farm Programs.  62 Fed. Reg.
50849 (Sept. 29, 1997).
PEANUTS. The CCC has adopted as final removal of
the regulations governing approval of cold storage
warehouses for peanuts under the peanut support program
because the CCC no longer uses cold storage warehouses.
62 Fed. Reg. 51760 (Oct. 3, 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ESTATE INCOME. The decedent died in 1988,
survived by siblings and descendants of deceased siblings.
The estate was not administered until 1996 when
administrators were appointed. No estate tax returns were
filed until 1996. The estate received items of income
during 1988 through 1996. Under state law, personal
property did not pass to heirs until collected by an
administrator, all claims against the estate were paid, and
the property was distributed to the heirs. The IRS ruled
that the income generated by the estate property was
income to the estate and not to the heirs. The IRS noted
that a penalty for failure to file estate income tax returns
would apply unless the failure resulted from a reasonable
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cause and not willful neglect. Ltr. Rul. 9740009, June 27,
1997.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* A decedent’s estate had created a
trust for the decedent’s children. The trust provided for
quarterly income payments to the children only if the child
requested the distribution for the child’s support and
maintenance. If no requested was made, that child’s share
was to be distributed to the grandchildren.  The IRS ruled
that the distribution power of each child was not a general
power of appointment and that the failure of a child to
request a distribution was not a transfer of property subject
to gift tax. Ltr. Rul. 9739006, June 20, 1997.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
taxpayer owned an interest in a partnership. Under the
partnership agreement, at the withdrawal of a partner
because of death or other reason, the partnership was to
pay the withdrawn partner or the partner’s estate a
percentage of the partnership profits for a fixed number of
years in addition to an amount for the withdrawn partner’s
capital account. The taxpayer planned to establish a
marital trust or testamentary bequest for the taxpayer’s
spouse and fund the bequest with the payments for the
partnership interest at the death of the taxpayer. The trust
or bequest would provide that partnership payments
representing the percentage of profits would be allocated
to principal in the amount of the payment discounted by
the applicable federal rate. The remaining amount of the
payment was to be allocated to income of the trust. The
IRS ruled that, because the allocation of income and
principal did not violate state law, the trust or bequest
would qualify for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul.
9739015, June 26, 1997; Ltr. Rul. 9739016, June 26,
1997; Ltr. Rul. 9739017, June 26, 1997; Ltr. Rul.
9739018, June 26, 1997.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The decedent had
received an income interest in a trust established by a
predeceased parent. The trust granted the decedent a
testamentary power to appoint trust principal by will to
any person. The estate argued that the power was not a
general power of appointment because state law would not
allow the decedent to appoint the principal to the
decedent’s estate. The court held that no such restriction
existed under state law and that the principal was in fact
appointed to the decedent’s estate; therefore, the decedent
held a general power of appointment over trust principal
which was properly included in the decedent’s gross
estate. Powers v. United States, 37 Fed. Cls. 709 (1997).
TAX RATES. The decedent died on January 12, 1993,
when the maximum tax rate on estates was 50 percent.
OBRA 1993 was signed by the President in August 1993
and retroactively reinstated the 55 percent maximum rate
on estates. The case also included taxable gifts made by a
taxpayer on January 18, 1993, again when the top rate was
50 percent. The gift tax top rate was also increased
retroactively to 55 percent by OBRA 1993. The
decedent’s estate and the taxpayer challenged the
retroactive increase of the top estate and gift tax rates as
unconstitutional as an unapportioned direct tax, as a
violation of due process, and an improper governmental
taking. The court held that the retroactive application of
the top rates was constitutional as a rational exercise of the
legislative purpose of raising revenue and was not a
confiscation of property. Quarty v. U.S., 97-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,288 (D. Ariz. 1997).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer owned a second summer
residence which included four lakeside acres split into
three lots. One lot contained a residence, the second
contained a guest houe and the third was unimproved. The
total acreage is comparable tlo the size of other properties
in the neighborhood. The IRS ruled that the entire
property was a qualified residence under Treas. Reg. §
25.2702-3(b). Ltr. Rul. 9739010, June 24, 1997.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer's employment was terminated and the taxpayer
sought restitution from the employer. After negotiations,
the parties agreed to a lump sum payment in settlement of
the taxpayer's grievances. The taxpayer argued that the
payment was excludible from gross income because the
payment was made in settlement of several tort claims.
The court held that the payment was includible in gross
income because the only claims raised by the taxpayer in
the negotiations were contract related and the employer
was not aware of any tort claims. The appellate court
affirmed in an opinion designated as not for publication.
Foster v. Comm'r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,687
(9th Cir. 1997), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-26.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed as a
district sales manager of an insurance company with
substantial income. The taxpayer purchased 5, 40 and 120
acre parcels for the construction of a residence and for use
in fish farming, harvesting timberland, and growing row
crops and Christmas trees. The taxpayer placed some of
the land in government subsidy programs, received
government disaster payments and made depreciable
improvements to the land. The taxpayer reported losses
from the farming activities for all seven tax years since the
purchase of the property. Due to equipment failure, the
fish farming activity produced only minimal sales of fish
and the loss of most of the fish. At the time of the trial, no
fish were being raised while a wind powered system was
being installed. The Christmas tree operation had not yet
produced any salable trees but the taxpayer estimated that
sales would begin within two years after the trial.
Although the taxpayer had begun some management of
the timberland, no trees had yet been cut for sale. The
taxpayer hired a local farmer to raise row crops on a small
portion of the larger tract and enrolled 14 acres of the 40
acre tract in the federal CRP. The court first held that all
of the taxpayer’s activities on the rural land would be
considered as one activity for purposes of the hobby loss
provisions. The court then held that the taxpayer did not
operate the farming business with an intent to make a
profit, based on the following factors. (1) The taxpayer
kept separate records for the business through an
accountant but the taxpayer did not present the records
into evidence, several checks were made for personal
expenses and the books were not well organized. (2) The
taxpayer did not expend much time on the farm other than
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that which contributed to the personal pleasure from rural
life. The row crops were produced by an independent
contractor. (3) The taxpayer failed to provide sufficient
evidence that the land and business assets would
appreciate in value. (4) The business had losses in all
years of operation. (5) The taxpayer had substantial
income from other sources which would be offset by the
losses. (6) The taxpayer had not had past success with
similar activities or much experience at the farming
activities attempted. (7) The taxpayer and family derived
personal and recreational pleasure from the activities.
Holmes V. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-401.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
DEFINITION. The taxpayer purchased a commercial
property with three other individuals with the intent to
immediately resell the property. When the property did not
sell quickly the purchasers maintained the property as a
rental property and filed federal partnership income tax
returns for three years. The partnership also maintained a
separate bank account. The taxpayer sold the taxpayer’s
interest in the partnership in the fourth year. The sales
contract listed the partnership interest as the interest sold
and not an interest in the property itself. The taxpayer
argued that the sale was of an interest in the property and
the loss on the sale was ordinary loss from the sale of
property held for resale, because no partnership was
formed. The taxpayer pointed to the facts that no
partnership agreement was executed, no trade or business
was operated and the parties had no intent to form a
partnership.  The court held that the evidence that the
partnership had income and expenses for three years and
the income and losses were reported on federal partnership
returns demonstrated that a partnership did exist and that
the sale consisted of the sale of the taxpayer’s interest in
the partnership, resulting in capital losses. Baker v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-442.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer
owned a 50 percent interest in a partnership which
defaulted on a loan. After negotiations, the lender
discharged a portion of the indebtedness. The taxpayer
was allocated a 50 percent share of the discharge of
indebtedness income.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayer’s
share of the discharge of indebtedness income increased
the taxpayer’s basis in the partnership interest; The
taxpayer’s share of the decrease in partnership liabilities
decreased the basis of the taxpayer’s partnership interest;
and the taxpayer’s share of the discharge of indebtedness
was excludible from the taxpayer’s income if the taxpayer
qualified for an exclusion under I.R.C. § 108. Ltr. Rul.
9739002, May 19, 1997.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
INCOME AND LOSS. The taxpayer formed a wholly-
owned farm S corporation. The corporation crop-share
leased 800 acres of farmland from an S corporation owned
by the taxpayer’s spouse, who acquired ownership by
transfer of the shares from the taxpayer to the spouse. The
taxpayer’s corporation also lease land from a third S
corporation owned by the taxpayer’s minor children,
resulting from transfer of the farm from the taxpayer to the
children. The taxpayer’s spouse also owned a corporation
which operated the spouse’s craft business. The taxpayer
did not keep separate accurate records for the various
corporations and the amount owed among the
corporations. The taxpayer’s corporation and the taxpayer
filed for bankruptcy but did not list any claim for rent due
to the other family corporations in the bankruptcy
proceedings. The taxpayer’s corporation received SBA
and FmHA disaster loans. The taxpayer’s corporation also
received disaster payments and crop insurance proceeds
which were administratively offset against amounts owed
to the SBA and the FmHA. The taxpayer’s corporation did
not report the insurance proceeds or disaster payments as
income in the year received. The taxpayer transferred
$110,000 to the spouse’s craft corporation in payment of
the rent owed by the taxpayer’s corporation, claiming that
the rent was paid in that manner because the other
corporations did not have bank accounts. The court denied
a deduction for the rental payments as not bona fide,
because the taxpayer did not list the rents as due on the
bankruptcy schedules, the rents were paid to a corporation
which did not own the land and no written lease or other
evidence of the rent obligation was presented as evidence.
The court also held that the disaster payments and crop
insurance proceeds were included in the taxpayer’s
income because (1) the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that
the disaster payments were received (setoff) as the result
of an eligible disaster under I.R.C. § 165, and (2) the crop
insurance proceeds were paid as a result of the taxpayer’s
inability to produce a crop, not the destruction of a crop.
The court noted that, as a cash method taxpayer, the
taxpayer’s S corporation would not have a basis in the
crops for which the disaster payments and insurance
proceeds were received; therefore, no casualty loss would
be realized to offset the payments. Foust v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1997-446.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME. The taxpayer was a
100 percent shareholder in two S corporations which
operated restaurants and 50 percent of an
S Corporation which operated a motel. The taxpayer
actively participated in the operation of the businesses and
operated a sole proprietorship which provided services to
the corporations. The taxpayer billed the corporations for
the services as an independent contractor. The taxpayer
calculated net earnings from self-employment using the
taxpayer’s share of net income or loss from the S
corporations, as well as income from the sole
proprietorship. Net losses from the corporations resulted
in negative net self-employment income for several tax
years. The taxpayer argued that, because the self-
employment tax provisions were enacted prior to the
enactment of the S corporation provisions, the absence of
a shareholder’s share of S corporation tax items from the
self-employment income definition indicated that the
taxpayer’s share of S corporation items was included in
self-employment income. The court noted that Rev. Rul.
59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225 had ruled that S corporation
items were not included in self-employment income and
that Congress had not amended the self-employment
provisions to negate that ruling. The court held that, since
Congress had not taken any action to change the statute
after the IRS ruling, the taxpayer could not include S
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corporation items of income and loss in determining the
taxpayer’s net earnings from self-employment. Ding v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-435.
NEGLIGENCE
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE. The plaintiff’s decedent
was an 11 year old boy who was killed while playing in
the ruins of a burned-down farm residence owned by one
defendant, on land leased by another defendant and burned
down by the third defendant volunteer fire department. A
portion of the chimney was left standing after the burn.
The decedent was visiting a relative who lived next to the
destroyed residence. The decedent was warned not to play
in the ruins but returned to the area and was killed after
removing several bricks, causing the chimney to collapse
on top of him. The plaintiff claimed negligence based on
the attractive nuisance doctrine. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the decedent was aware
of the danger of removing bricks from a chimney. The
court held that the decedent was old enough and shown to
have at least average intelligence for his age so as to have
suffiicent awareness of the danger; therefore, the attractive
nuisance doctrine did not apply to impose liability on the
defendants for the accident. Griffin v. Woodard, 486
S.E.2d 240 (N.C. App. 1997).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The debtor was a cotton grower who had
granted a security interest in the cotton crop to the lessor
of the land on which the crop was grown. The lessor
executed a financing statement in April 1993. The lessor
then sold the property under an agreement which allocated
the rent between the lessor and the new buyer. The debtor
also borrowed money from a commercial lender to finance
the production of the cotton crop and granted the lender a
security interest in the same crop. The lender filed a
financing statement in May 1993. The debtor hired
another company to harvest the cotton and granted that
company a security interest in the cotton. The harvesting
company filed a financing statement in July 1993. The
proceeds of the cotton were insufficient to pay all of the
debts and the issue was the priority of the three security
interests. Under La. Rev. Stat. § 3:2651 a statutory priority
was available first to laborers and second to lessors who
could assert a lessor’s privilege.  An initial issue was
whether the statute applied to the proceeds of the cotton.
The court held that the priority statute applied to harvested
and unharvested cotton so long as the security interest
arose while the cotton was unharvested. The parties
argued that the harvesting company was not a laborer
entitled to the top priority under the statute. The court held
that the harvesting company was not entitled to the top
priority as a laborer because the company hired other
workers to actually harvest the cotton. The court also held
that the lessor could not assert statutory priority because
the lessor did not assert its lessor’s priority within 15 days
after the cotton was harvested. The court also held that the
buyer of the land did not have a perfected security interest
in the cotton crop because no assignment of the security
interest was included in the sale agreement and the buyer
failed to properly perfect a security interest in the cotton
crop. Thus, the priority of the security interests was based
on the date of perfection as to the original lessor, the
lender and the harvesting company. Bayou Pierre Farms
v. BAT Farms Partners, III, 693 So.2d 1158 (La. 1997),
aff’g, 676 So.2d 643 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
C O R P O R A T E  O W N E R S H I P  O F
AGRICULTURAL LAND .  The plaintiff was a
cooperative organized under the Nebraska Nonstock
Cooperative Marketing Act (NCMA) with five individuals
as member/shareholders. The plaintiff applied for and
expected to be granted exempt status under I.R.C. § 521(a)
as a farmer-owned cooperative providing products solely
to its members on a patronage basis. The plaintiff sought
to acquire an existing swine farrowing and nursery facility
to operate solely for the benefit of its members. All pigs
produced in the facility would be distributed to the
members only. Article XII, Section 8 of the Nebraska
Constitution restricted the ownership of agricultural land
by corporations but exempted nonprofit corporations. The
trial court had held that a nonstock cooperative was a
nonprofit corporation and was exempt from the land
ownership restrictions. Section 21-1401(2) of the NCMA
stated that cooperatives formed under the act were deemed
nonprofit and the plaintiff argued that this statement was
controlling for purposes of the land ownership restriction.
The appellate court disagreed, finding that the cooperative
was formed for the purpose of distributing profits to the
members and did not qualify as a nonprofit corporation for
purposes of the land ownership restrictions. Pig Pro
Nonstock Coop. v. Moore, __ N.W.2d __, 253 Neb. 72
(Neb. 1997) . An article by Dr. Harl on this case will be
published in a future issue of the Digest.
CITATION UPDATES
In re Fegeley, 118 F.3d 979 (3d Cir. 1997) (discharge
of taxes) see p. 147 supra.
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2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 5-9, 1998 at the
spectacular ocean-front Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on
the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business exclusion,
handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both
spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
   •  Ethics (2 hours).
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
group discount air fares on United Airlines, available
through Sun Quest Vacations. In addition, attendees are
eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort, the site of the seminar.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares
and insure availability of convenient flights at a busy travel
time of the year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
If you have not yet received a registration packet call
Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958.
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